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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
LIND t, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 970747-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to withdraw 
her no contest plea for class A misdemeanor attempted theft. The State is entitled to 
appeal this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(g) (Supp. 1997). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the district court have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a no 
contest plea made more than thirty days after entry of the plea? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
The State preserved this issue by timely objecting to the district court's grant of 
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, on the ground that the motion was untimely 
1 
(R. 63). Moreover, this case presents a jurisdictional issue, which may be raised at any 
time. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah App. 1992). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw a plea 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Child Support 
Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah App. 1994) (whether court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is question of law). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion 
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a September 1, 1995 information with theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code .Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 05). On September 
15, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to attempted theft, a 
class A misdemeanor, with the plea to be held in abeyance pending a determination of 
how much restitution defendant should be assessed and full payment of that restitution (R. 
18-22, 26-27, 47-49, 52, 54-55). On November 6, 1997, the district court permitted 
2 
defendant to withdraw her plea over the State's objection (R. 30, 63-64). The written 
order was entered on December 1, 1997 (R. 31; Addendum A). 
The State filed its notice of appeal on December 5, 1997 (R. 33). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Between August 10th and September 7th, 1994, defendant, without authorization, 
deposited into her personal bank account three checks belonging to her former employer, 
Cook's Books2 (R. 05-06, 19, 54-55). The amount of the checks totaled $1,530.28 (R. 26, 
61). Based on these facts, the State charged defendant with third degree felony theft3 (R. 
05-06). 
On September 15, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to 
a reduced charge of class A misdemeanor attempted theft, with the plea to be held in 
abeyance (R. 05-06, 19, 26, 46, 52). Before taking the plea, the district court engaged in a 
brief colloquy with defendant regarding her rights and her understanding of the plea 
agreement (R. 50-52). Defendant also signed in open court a plea affidavit that stated she 
!The facts relating to defendant's conduct are based on the probable cause 
statement in the information, factual statements in the plea affidavit and plea in abeyance 
agreement, and on factual representations made to the court by both parties. 
Apparently, the checks had been sent to defendant from customers who had 
bought goods from Cook's Books through defendant (R. 48, 55). Instead of forwarding 
the checks on to Cook's Books, defendant endorsed and deposited them into her own 
account (R. 48, 55). 
3See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (Supp. 1997) which classifies theft of 
property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $5,000 as a third degree felony. 
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knew and understood that if she desired to withdraw her plea, she must do so by filing a 
motion within thirty days after entry of her plea (R. 22; Addendum B at 5; R. 55). The 
plea affidavit contained defense counsel's certification that defendant had either read the 
statements in her plea affidavit or had them read to her and that counsel had discussed the 
affidavit with her and believed that she was mentally and physically competent and that 
she understood the meaning of the affidavit's contents (R. 23; Addendum B at 6). 
Defendant claimed that she appropriated the checks because her former employer 
owed her commissions for sales that she had made while working for the company (R. 
55). Therefore, the written "plea in abeyance" agreement provided for a restitution 
hearing at which the court would determine whether Cook's Books owed defendant any 
money and, if so, how much (R. 26; Addendum C). The agreement stated that if the 
district court determined that Cook's Books owed defendant $1,530.28 or more, then 
defendant would pay no restitution to her former employer and the plea in abeyance could 
be withdrawn and the case dismissed six months after entry of the plea (R. 26). However, 
in the event defendant owed money to Cook's Books, she would be ordered to pay that 
amount within a time period to be agreed upon by the parties (R. 27). After any 
restitution had been paid in full, defendant would be allowed to withdraw her plea and the 
case would be dismissed (R. 27). 
At defendant's request, the restitution hearing was set for November 6, 1997, more 
than thirty days later, to give defendant time to gather evidence regarding how much her 
4 
former employer owed her (R. 53). At the restitution hearing, defendant represented to 
the court that after offsetting the monies owed her by her former employer, she owed the 
company $687.00 in restitution4 (R. 61). Despite this information, the court stated that 
the case appeared to be a simple accounting matter between the parties that should be 
resolved civilly (R.62). The court expressed its discomfort with allowing defendant's 
plea to stand under the circumstances (R. 62, 66-67). 
Arguing that the offset made it clear that she did not have the requisite criminal 
intent to commit theft, defendant moved to withdraw her plea (R. 64). The State objected 
on the ground that more than thirty days had passed since defendant entered her plea and 
that Utah Code Ann.§ 77-13-6(2) and State v. Price, 873 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) 
prohibited the grant of defendant's motion (R. 63-64). The court acknowledged, in effect, 
that there was a thirty-day limitation period for withdrawing a guilty or no contest plea 
and that this period had passed (R. 64). The court nevertheless granted defendant's 
motion, stating that it believed there was good cause for allowing the withdrawal (R. 64). 
4This representation was actually made in a previous off-the-record discussion 
between the parties and the court (R. 60-62). The district court summarized the prior 
discussion for the record (R. 60-62). The State does not concede the accuracy of the 
$687.00 figure. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant moved to withdraw her no contest plea more than thirty days 
after she entered her plea, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider her 
motion. Accordingly, the district court's grant of defendant's motion should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER PLEA BECAUSE THE 
MOTION WAS MADE MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER 
ENTRY OF THE PLEA. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1995) provides that a guilty or no contest plea "may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court," and that a 
motion to withdraw such a plea "shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." 
This Court has held that "if a defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is 
entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw filed after the 
thirty-day period." State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Price, 
837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 n.2 
(Utah 1993) (implying that if defendant does not move to withdraw plea within 30 days, 
any available remedy may only be sought through post-conviction proceedings). 
In other words, so long as the defendant has been informed of the thirty-day 
limitation period, that period is jurisdictional. Once it has passed without a motion to 
6 
withdraw, the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider whether good cause for the 
withdrawal exists. Canfield. 917 P.2d at 562; Price. 837 P.2d at 583. 
In this case, defendant was informed of the thirty-day limitation period in her plea 
affidavit, which she executed in open court after a brief colloquy with the judge (R. 22, 
50-52). Defendant did not move to withdraw her no contest plea until nearly two months 
after its entry (R. 31, 62). The trial court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to even 
consider defendant's motion, must less grant it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's granting of defendant's motion to withdraw her no contest plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jX* day of Mto/ 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
.AURA B. DUPAi: 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this /2*-1 day of Utu/ , 1998,1 caused to be 
mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, two accurate and correct copies of the 
foregoing appellant's brief to counsel for appellee, JOAN WATT and LYNN R. 
BROWN, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South #300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Order Allowing Defendant to Withdraw Her Plea 
LYNN R. BROWN, #0460 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
TWr3«.--d.oia: jjctrict 
D E W 1997 
% 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LINDA KALMAR, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO 
WITHDRAW NO CONTEST 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Case no. 971900756FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Pursuant to the defendants motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that her plea In 
abeyance to a Class A Theft that was entered on September 15, 1997 Is withdrawn. After 
reviewing the material and discussing the matter with Emle Jones, Deputy District Attorney 
and defendants attorney, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion of the defendant 
terminates the plea in abeyance and declines to enter judgement against her. 
DATED this _?^2=rdayTJfKovember , 1997. 
HONORABLH5AV1ID S. 
Third District Court) 
ADDENDUM B 
Plea Affidavit 
(Statement of Defendant and Certificate of Counsel and Order) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE Qp UTAH Third Judfcial District 
SEP 1 5 1397 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
//vu3a Kzyyufi'V 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENI 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
Case No. FS 
COMES NOW, A * * x ^ khwi'V' , the defendant in this case 
and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guiltyMno contestHo the following crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
A. t-rfot 
B. 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, 
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading 
(guiltynno contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
jjtruHi /tt- Jr<Ypg^ Jm oifr^ tfo QUA—* < ^ / / ^ e JeJu, ~Xer?«sqfr A •a* 
kaJhU, ^ sf^> 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
(have not) (Wave) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right 
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following 
reasons: 
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
L\Lw*> yf. , and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, 
my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense 
to testify in court upon by behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to 
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial 
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and 
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court 
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be 
3 
paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to 
which I plead ^ \m^r(r\o contest)/ I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an 
offense that carries V-f^ hiTmum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself 
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the 
sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know 
that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by Utah 
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am 
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving 
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also 
know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have 
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (guHfy) too contest^) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions. 
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this 
4 
affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty) 
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my 
plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the 
attached plea agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and 
I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. lam fjh Years of age; I have attended school through t h e ^ / ^ 
and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
5 
impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any 
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this /£~ day of &fj , 1 &7. 
j ^ t & &L 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^ ^ 4 ^ /%/n^Af) , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read 
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
'/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
jhsitZL* /fti&ts^j? , defendant. I have reviewed this statement of 
the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of 
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or 
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are 
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which 
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
7 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification 
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the 
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in 
the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this /jf day of <^f , 19 J*1. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Agreement for Plea in Abeyance 
Thiro juvvciai District 
SEP 1 5 1997 
AGREEMENT FOR PLEA IN ABEYANCE / 
/ / r £ A L T LAKE COUNTY 
In accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code §77 
2a-2,3 sr. 4. Linda Kaimar, by and through her attorney, Lynn R. Brown and the State by 
and through Its attorney Bmie )ones and with the approval of this Court, enter Into the 
following agreement for a plea in abeyance: 
1. The defendant will enter a no contest plea to Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
2. At the time Linda Kaimar enters a no contest plea, the attorney for the State, 
Ernie ]ones and the attorney for Linda Kaimar, Lynn R. Brown will move the Court to hold 
the plea in abeyance and not enter a judgment of conviction nor impose sentence pending 
the completion of this agreement. Linda Kaimar waives her right to have sentence imposed 
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
3. It is understood by the parties, that the issue to be resolved by this agreement 
and plea in abeyance is whether or not Linda Kaimar owes any restitution to her former 
employer, Cooks Books, for having deposited three checks into her personal checking account 
in the total amount of $1,530.28. 
4. To resolve the question of restitution, it is agreed that the Court may set a 
restitution hearing date and allow the parties at that time to present evidence to support their 
claims. 
5. If the Court determines at a restitution hearing that Linda Kaimar has money 
owing to her by Cooks Books In the amount of $1,530.28 or more then it Is agreed that. 
Mrs. Kaimar will pay no restitution to Cooks Books and the plea In abeyance may be 
withdrawn and the case dismissed by the Court, after at least 6 months has expired from the 
n \. 
date of the entry of the plea. 
6. If the Court determines at the restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar owes any 
amount to Cooks Books, then Mrs. Kalmar will be ordered to pay the determined amount 
within a specified time frame to be agreed upon by the parties. After completing the 
payment of restitution as ordered by the Court, the plea in abeyance may be withdrawn and 
the case dismissed. 
7. If at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, Linda Kalmar 
violated any conditions, the Court may order her appearance to show cause why the 
agreement should not be terminated, if it is determined after an evidentiary hearing that 
Mrs. Kalmar has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of this agreement, 
the Court may terminate the agreement and enter judgement and conviction and impose 
sentence against her for the offense to which the original plea was entered. 
This agreement entered into this (h day of September, 1997. 
ERNIC JONES, Deputy 
LMAR, Defendant 
I M N R. BROWN, Attorney for Defendant 
The terms and conditions as 
provided in this agreement,, 
are approved by the Court ""'':,. 
A AZ: \ \ 
